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A. Introduction
This paper will discuss the structure of corporate ownership and control in the United
States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although both countries experienced
similar historical trends towards greater institutional ownership, their subsequent treatment
of the consequences of this evolution is substantially different. Taken as a whole, this
comparison can allow more thorough and exhaustive analysis of the corporate governance
concerns that plague both systems. We hope to meet the challenge of expounding upon the
parallels and variances between the two nations in order to create an ongoing dialogue
regarding these tenuous issues facing capital markets and public corporations.
B. U.S. Section
The Evolved Ownership and Control Paradigm

I.

Introduction

The separation of ownership and control has long been a source of tension in U.S.
corporate governance. The tension naturally arises in publicly traded corporations where the
shareholders are unable to directly govern and instead must elect boards to exercise control on
their behalf. As with any agency relationship, conflicts and divergence of interest arise and in
an effort to diminish the associated agency costs, a number of mechanisms have been tested
and implemented: the application of fiduciary duties, management financial incentive
structures, and a variety of regulatory schemes. Despite the necessary tensions intrinsic in this
relationship, there are substantial benefits to this separation as well, namely creating a more
efficient capital market system in which investors are able to use their time to invest rather
than govern, but more significantly, allowing corporations to be more than pure profit
maximizers and simultaneously prioritize stakeholder interests and corporate social
responsibility. As the structure of share ownership has evolved, so too did the original
ownership and control paradigm, and now the worry is if the indispensable separation
between ownership and control has diminished too greatly. While the original moral hazard
problems still exist, there are now additional costs that have arisen as a consequence of these
new shifts in the traditional model.
This section of the paper will primarily attempt to answer these central questions
regarding U.S. corporate structure: 1) given the current relationship between investors and the
governing board, what have been the most fundamental consequences of this change, 2) if this
4

effectively has narrowed the separation of control and ownership, what are then the
implications of this transformation, and 3) looking forward, is the current path a sustainable
one for the future of corporate governance and corporate value? By acting as the internal
governing vehicle on behalf of shareholders, the board’s primary responsibility is to monitor
management. However, the board’s duty is to the corporate entity, not to its shareholders.
Thus, when the board’s interests becomes either overly divergent from shareholders’, or when
they simply acquiesce to them, the board’s governance becomes grossly insufficient. Policies
that actively encourage greater shareholder control may in fact undermine the traditional
reasons behind the separation of control from ownership.
Since the end of World War II, the original Berle and Means corporate ownership
structure in the United States has evolved from a diffuse, predominantly retail shareholder
base to a composition of more concentrated, institutional holders. This gradual shift, while
intriguing in itself, has had great implications for governance and the relationship between
ownership and control. The consequences of these broad changes in corporate control cannot
be fully explained by a move away from dispersed ownership, however. As shareholders have
been given greater deference and more governance tools to further their ability to seek and
maintain a voice in corporate discussions, these changes have allowed shareholders ever
greater access to control and activism.
The original Berle and Means agency problem stemmed from the disconnect that
existed between a board effectively controlled by management and the dispersed, individual
investors. Shareholders, once powerless, now have an advent of options to affect control, and
this expanded influence of institutional holders has both transformed the original agency
problem and created new agency tensions: 1) board myopia and the subsequent acquiescence
towards shareholders, 2) the dichotomous relationship between the beneficiary owners of
shares and their intermediary holders and 3) minority, activist hedge funds acting as
controlling shareholders. The limited commitment problem, which depends on the prevailing
belief that most institutional holders are rationally short-term, drives each of these agency
problems. Due to information asymmetry and inefficiency, strong exit rights, and generally
shorter investment holding periods, it is argued that shareholders are less likely to know when
a long-term investment will pay off and thus will remain less committed to long-term business
strategies proposed by the board, especially if presented with profitable alternatives such as a
push for dividend distribution, the sale of shares through hostile takeovers, or the removal and
election of directors by proxy.
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While the Berle and Means scenario focused on the dangers of misalignment, today’s
corporate ownership and control concern should be on board acquiescence. Boards, in an
effort to appease powerful instituitional investors and keep their positions, may agree to more
short-term value creation, so in addition to concerns regarding moral hazard, board myopia
now also plagues the relationship between shareholders and directors. Given the incentives
structure of these institutions, in which they mainly earn profit through diversification and
success of their portfolios, rather than through a focused interest on any particular
corporation, institutional shareholders are arguably less likely to value governance rights.
Their supposedly more short-term approach to ownership and governance differs from the
longer-term concerns of the actual beneficial owners of these shares. This tension from the
limited commitment problem is at the root of the more complex agency problem of activist
hedge funds acting as controlling shareholders. Hedge funds often do not own a controlling
bloc of shares but have been able to act as majority shareholders. This ability to exercise
control, of course, is dependent on other institutional investors’ cooperation, and when they
do “collude” together, whether purposefully or not, they tend to have specific, targeted
agendas. The limited commitment problem is truly exacerbated here; academic literature
repeatedly articulates that hedge fund activists have strong incentive to convince other
investors to abandon their longer-term strategies, even if at the eventual detriment to the
corporation, other stakeholders, and even shareholders themselves. Under US corporate law,
minority holders like activists would not owe any fiduciary duties to other shareholders.
However, it is foreseeable that the interests of shareholders, controlling or not, are likely to be
in conflict. That activists have the ability to effectuate control without the corresponding
ownership and necessary capital risk is intriguing and it is worth further examination whether
the fiduciary duty of loyalty should be levied on them.
The shift to more concentrated institutional ownership has created several new
corporate governance questions, but the overall theme of this trend is that dominant
shareholders are both more incentivized and now possess the ability to influence their fellow
shareholders and consequently, able to discipline management, which might work in direct
opposition to the longer-term values and interests of minority holders, beneficiary owners,
and the general corporate entity. How did institutional holders come to possess an increased
ability to influence boards and management? Are the interests of activist and minority holders
necessarily different, and if so, why? Or even those of beneficiary owners and the
intermediary institutions? These questions can only be answered by initially understanding the
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incentive structures that motivate institutional owners. The once problematic implications of
separation of ownership and control no longer exist in the same form, only to be replaced by
more complex corporate governance issues.

II.

The Shift Away from the Berle and Means Corporation

When Berle and Means originally published Modern Corporation and Private Property
in 1932, their description of America’s dispersed shareholder ownership and the consequent
separation of ownership and control was an accurate depiction of the U.S. corporate world.1
Shareholders were mainly retail investors who had little incentive to become intricately
involved in the governance process of any particular corporation. For any investor,
diversification is integral and being able to reduce firm specific risk allows otherwise riskaverse shareholders to invest their capital with potentially risk-loving management. While this
scheme allows the capital market system to function efficiently, this also necessarily means
investors have multiple points of interest and likely conflicted interests. Retail investors of the
Berle-Means era could not feasibly monitor corporate boards and insiders,2 nor would they
likely have desired to. And because of how widely spread out these investors were, there was
the justified concern that they were weak and passive, essentially powerless before the whims
of the board and management.3 Understandably, the authors emphasized a more paternalistic
approach towards corporate actors and believed there was a need for regulatory measures to
serve both as a protection mechanism for shareholders and a control mechanism to prevent
management from engaging in potentially harmful and risky behavior both to investors and to
society.4 Boards who actively and effectively monitor management would have ideally
reduced agency costs that occur as a basic consequence of this separation of ownership and
control. The question on how best to diminish the agency costs associated with the separation
of ownership and control is one that still very much exists and continues to trouble regulators
and corporate governance experts alike.
In the past fifty years, the fundamental nature of ownership has changed. Retail
owners are now in the minority of American holders and institutional owners have gained a

1

ADOLF BERLE AND GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, TRANSACTION
PUBLISHERS (1932) [hereinafter “Berle”].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means revisited: the governance and power of large U.S. corporations,
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 2 (Apr. 2004).
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significantly greater stake in the equity holdings of America’s corporations.5 During this same
time period, both the SEC and corporate actors themselves have acquiesced in giving
shareholders more authority.6 Proxy voting, “Say on Pay” provisions, the election of outsider
directors are all indicators of increased shareholder authority and equally importantly, they are
vehicles by which shareholders can gain more power and control. While many institutional
holders are reluctant to exercise an active role in the direction and governance of corporations,
corporate governance literature suggest many institutional investors tend to agree with other
institutional investors on questions of governance and control.7 Thus, even if one institutional
shareholder does not account for a substantial segment of a corporation’s investor base, an
aggressive shareholder can make a noticeable difference if it has the support of the other
institutional holders.

III.

Who Owns American Corporations Today?

In today’s capital markets, over 70% of the top 500 U.S. corporations are held by
institutional investors.8 Retail ownership has declined substantially but still make up almost a
substantial investor base in the U.S. capital markets. Government ownership of public
corporations in the U.S. has been significantly less common throughout the 20th century
compared to other developed nations and was “virtually non-existent in recent U.S.
experience until the 2008 financial crisis.”9 Despite having wholly-government owned
corporations in the U.S.10, “mixed enterprises”, with both private and government ownership,
are generally viewed skeptically and suspiciously by the American people. The government
bailout of banks and corporations post-recession was subject to significant criticism and
corporate actors were eager to have the state sell their ownership stakes. Although there is
plenty to say in regards to retail and government ownership of public corporations, for
5

THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION
AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION, Table 10 (2010) [hereinafter “Conference Board”].

6
Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J.
Corp. L. 681, 686-89 (2007) (discussing the amendments to the SEC proxy regulations in 1992 that greatly
expanded the ability of shareholders to influence change in corporations); see also Robert C. Pozen, Institutional
Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Jan.-Feb. 1994).
7
GILE R. DOWNES ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, AEI, 3, 4, 9 (1999) (positing
that all institutional investors agree on furthering shareholder rights, voting against bad governance (regardless
of performance), poison pills, share repricing) [Hereinafter “Downes”].
8
Conference Board, supra note 5.
9
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, FORDHAM LAW REV., Vol 80, Iss. 6 2925
(2012) (noting that even if the U.S. government has employed the corporate form, they did it through soleproprietorships or as guarantors, rather than shareholders of private capital) [hereinafter “Pargendler”].
10
To name a few: Amtrak, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Conrail, North Dakota Mill and Elevator.
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purposes of this paper, it is more relevant to look at the rise of institutional ownership and its
subsequent influence on the control paradigm.
Gilson and Gordon describe three types of institutional shareholders: mutual funds,
pension funds, and hedge funds.11 Mutual funds are investment companies that are subject to
strict regulatory oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“the SEC”).12 One of
these rules requires that holders of securities in mutual funds must be able to withdraw their
funds at any time, which consequently mandates these funds develop a more short-term
investment strategy that permits immediate liquidity.13 Record owners for any mutual fund are
only subject to very low minimal investments, and because of these lower minimum
requirements, the holders in a mutual fund are typically less sophisticated, less wealthy
“laymen” investors who use these investments for longer-term gains. In selecting their
portfolio managers, investors follow the relative performance of these funds, by comparing
the performance of all funds market wide.14 This type of selection process has direct
consequences on investment strategy. The success of a mutual fund portfolio ultimately
depends almost entirely on having an advantage over the market, meaning that fund managers
ultimately value private gains over shared market gains.
Pension funds share many of the same features as mutual funds, with the main
difference being that the beneficiaries, the employees of the organization, are obliged to join
in the fund.15 It is important to point out that trustees and managers of pension funds have
occasionally engaged in politicization of their funds, sometimes ethically, sometimes not.16 In
2015, the Obama Administration’s Labor Department issued Interpretative Bulletin 2015-01
declaring that “[e]nvironmental, social and governance issues may have a direct relationship
to the economic value of the plan’s investment” and explicitly allows pension fund managers
to consider other factors beyond pure profit maximization.17 Although this rule now gives

11
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and The
Revaluation of Governance Rights, COL. LAW REV. Vol 113:863 (2013) [hereinafter “Gilson”].
12
Arthur H. Kohn and Julie L. Yip-Williams, The Separation of Ownership from Ownership: Concerns Arising
from Institutional Investors as Intermediaries, THE CONFERENCE BOARD (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter “Kohn”].
13
Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, SEC, available at:
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited February 22, 2016). It should be noted that despite
immediate redepemtion rights, a signifcant portion of the funding is not touched for years at a time and many
funds have very low turn-over rates.
14
Gilson, supra note 11, at 894.
15
Kohn, supra note 12.
16
A less than ethical instance involved the President of CalPers, who also served as the Executive Director of
Safeway’s Union, who used CalPer’s position as a major shareholder of Safeway to try and intervene in the
Union’s dispute with the company. He was later removed from the board of CalPers.
17
Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering
Economically Targeted Investments (Oct. 2015).
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more leeway to pension fund managers to substitute in less quantifiable variables for their
investment strategies, they generally have had similar investment strategies to mutual funds
since these portfolio managers are also selected based on the superior relative returns they can
create. No fund manager is incentivized to chase after gains that do not reflect their
competitive advantage of the market. Because of their similar investment strategies, Gilson
argues that pension and mutual funds alike are less likely to strongly value governing rights.18
A poorly managed corporation might demand some level of shareholder involvement, but
successfully intervening would create value for all shareholders to enjoy, which is directly
contrary to these funds’ investment strategies. The success of mutual and pension funds’
portfolios are dependent on private gains, rather than collective benefits. Furthermore, fund
managers will engage in the practice of “underweighting” some of their shares—allowing the
fund manager to benefit in relative terms if the price of the stock declines in the market—but
ultimately incentivizing them from improving the corporation’s performance.19 Given both
the compensation structure of these institutions, the hypothesis is that these institutional
investors have little incentive to participate in governance decisions.20 Consequently, the
portfolio managers are arguably less motivated to engage in governance interventions to
optimize the management and value of any particular corporation. And while undervaluing
governance rights may be in the best interest of the fund managers and funds themselves, this
serves to create a new agency problem between the institutional holders and the beneficial
owners of the shares, dubbed “agency capitalism” by Gilson and Gordon and explored at
length later on in this paper.21
Hedge funds are structured in a substantively different way from these other funds.
Primarily because they are not required to register with the SEC, hedge funds are not subject
to many of the same strict regulations that govern these other institutional holders.22 Their
securities are issued in “private offerings” to highly sophisticated investors who meet a high
wealth minimum. Most importantly, their investments are not subject to immediate
redemption and liquidity requirements.23 Shareholders typically cannot demand to redeem
their shares at any time, and this gives hedge funds the flexibility to implement longer-term

18

Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, Univ. of Penn. Law School, Paper 1458, 1314 (2015).
19
Simon C.Y. Wong, How conflicts of interest thwart institutional investor stewardship, BUTTERWORTHS
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW (Sept. 2011).
20
Id.; see also Gilson, supra note 11.
21
Gilson, supra note 11.
22
Kohn, supra note 12.
23
Id.
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investment strategies should they choose. Because of the higher wealth and investment
requirement and the longer-hold period, the return on these securities are generally
significantly higher. Hedge funds are able to hold more concentrated positions in a fewer
number of corporations, and analysis of activist hedge fund portfolio turnover rates suggests
longer holding periods of around 20 months.24 Given all of these differentiating factors,
hedge funds have significantly different investment strategies and a small segment of them
have become activist investors25: they acquire a non-controlling but significant stake in a
given corporation in an attempt to improve the corporation’s governance and business
practices, whether through private discussions with the board or more aggressive tactics.26 In
contrast to other institutional holders, activist hedge funds tend to place a higher value on
governance rights and choose to monitor boards to extract private gains from successful
interventions.27 The true value creation of activism is debated amongst legal scholars,
practitioners, and jurists across the country28—whether hedge funds, with the help and
acquiescence of other institutional shareholders, actually contribute any genuine value to the
corporate entity or to minority shareholders is not easily measured and too substantial a topic
to discuss justly here. Putting aside any additional value judgments tied to activism, the
corporate control and governance questions that the activist evolution has generated are
certainly pertinent to this discussion and should be addressed.
One key requirement for the activist’s success is the cooperation of the other
institutional shareholders. These are no longer the dispersed and powerless investors of
yester-year and even while some institutional investors are purportedly less interested in
governance rights, they still value short-term profitability and shareholder rights, which
activists tend to emphasize.29 Having the support of institutional holders during proxy contests
or activist interventions is extremely advantageous, and this support is probably the most
significant factor in any hedge fund’s success. The prevalent use of shareholder advisory

24

Brav et al., The Return to Hedge Fund Activism, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (Mar 2008).
It should be clarified that not all activists are hedge funds and certainly not all hedge funds are activists, but
the most prominent and active activists are hedge funds.
26
Shane Goodwin, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Sept. 2015)
(arguing that the compensation structure and the deregulation of hedge funds makes them better monitors of
management than other institutional investors).
27
Id.
28
The infamous disagreement between Lucian Bebchuk and Marty Lipton over activism has been considerably
discussed and analyzed by corporate law academics, jurists, and practitioners, but there is no objective standard
on who is correct as to the long-term value creation of activism.
29
Downes, supra note 7.
25
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services can also be considered a contributing factor in this institutional “collusion.” 30 In
Nelson Peltz’s recent campaign over DuPont, the proxy advisory firms were clearly biased
towards the activist and recommended the company’s largest institutional holders to vote for
Peltz’s recommended board members.31 While the shareholders ignored the proxy
recommendations and sided with the DuPont board, it is significant to note that proxy
advisory firms tend to favor activism. The concern would be then that institutional
shareholders who use proxy advisory services are passive voters and merely follow the proxy
recommendations, even if their voting recommendations are clearly biased. In a recent study
on institutional investors, it was reported that the average portfolio manager who manages
$100 billion or more in assets, only make approximately 10% of all voting decisions.32
Outsourcing research and voting decisions arguably can induce boards to make decisions that
acquiesce to policies favored by proxy advisory firms, but may in fact decrease shareholder
value.33 However, according to other academic research, while a substantial subset of
institutional investors may use proxy advisory firms, they do not substitute the proxy’s
recommendations for their own voice.34 The influence of proxy advisory firms is not
insignificant,35 but perhaps its influence on governance questions has been overstated by the
media.

IV. U.S. treatment of shareholders and the subsequent effect on the corporation
a) Fiduciary Duties owed to and by shareholders

In the U.S., the courts give significant guidance on the fiduciary duties directors owe
to corporations to maximize value.36 Although traditionally expressed as duties to the
corporation, the only group allowed to bring derivative suits against directors and

30

Nadya Malenko and Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity
Design, Boston College (2015) (emphasizing the role of proxy advisory firms in influencing voting outcomes is
‘substantial and should not be understated) [hereinafter “Malenko”].
31
David Benoit, Proxy Adviser Backs Two Trian Board Seats at DuPont, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 27,
2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/iss-backs-activist-trian-getting-two-board-seats-at-dupont-1430145193.
32
SEC, 2015 INVESTOR SURVEY DECONSTRUCTING PROXY STATEMENTS-WHAT MATTERS TO INVESTORS (2015).
33
Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, Stanford Journal of Law and
Economics (Oct. 30, 2014).
34
Joseph A. McCahery, et al. Behind the Scenes: the Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional
Investors, Journal of Finance (June 2015) (arguing that investors who use proxy advisory firms make their own
decisions and only use proxy recommendations to gather further guidance on the issues).
35
Malenko, supra note 25.
36
These include the duty of loyalty, duty of care, and the less explicit but equally important duties of good faith
and fair dealing.
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management for breaches of their duties are shareholders.37 The same fiduciary duties that are
owed to shareholders by the board are not owed equivocally by the shareholders to each other
or to the corporation. What this means is that investors often have the freedom to vote for
governance or business decisions that will primarily benefit themselves, even if at the expense
of the corporation, other shareholders, and stakeholders. While duties of loyalty and care have
traditionally only applied to officers and directors, courts have occasionally applied loyalty
duties on majority shareholders on behalf of the minority holders.38 The duty prohibits
controlling shareholders from exercising their controlling influence in such a way to extract
private gains for themselves that are in detriment to the minority’s interests, but this
application of duties on shareholders is rare. The limit is almost only applied in two
circumstances: freeze-out mergers and close corporations.39 In order to be a “controlling”
shareholder, the investor generally needs to hold more than 50% of shares40 and specifically,
needs to exercise actual control over the corporation.
Perhaps one reason courts are generally reluctant to import duties onto investors
because historically shareholders were believed to have little influence on corporate
governance.41 If shareholders were unable to have real say or effect on the corporation, there
was no need to impose limits on their actions. In the United States, the focus of corporate
governance has primarily been on the relationship between the board and the shareholders,
and rarely on the relationship between shareholders.42 Another possible reason is that there
remains an entrenched belief that minority shareholders who are concerned enough about
corporate value to wage an intervention or proxy contest for change, are ultimately attempting
to benefit the corporation and all shareholders.43 While certainly not homogenous, the
interests of non-controlling shareholders are assumedly similar and perhaps, minority
37

Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, JOURNAL OF
CORPORATION LAW, Vol. 31, 662 (2006) [hereinafter “Fisch”].
38
In re John Q. Hammon Hotels, 2009 WL 3165613 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (clarifying that minority
shareholders should have procedural protections especially considering the controlling shareholder and the
minority shareholders were competing for the same consideration).
39
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev, 1255, 12711272 (2008) [hereinafter “Anabtawi”].
40
The exception being if the shareholder holds a large enough voting block that they can influence the board
without soliciting help from other shareholders. The block is significant enough to create change by itself and
independent of additional support.
41
Anabtawi, supra note 39, at 1267-1268.
42
This is in startling contrast with Germany’s corporate governance which recognizes the conflicts that would
likely arise between shareholders and imposes fiduciary duties on them.
43
Id.; see also J.A.C. Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations, 1972
DUKE L.J. 921, 934 (arguing that in US corporate law, the courts have rarely imposed obligations on minority
shareholders, except for the vote and when the vote is exercised, it is assumed to be “exercised by a person
interested in promoting the corporation’s welfare and the value of the investment represented by the stock.”).
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shareholders willing to engage with the board, primarily do it to increase value that all
shareholders can share in. Of course, this belief rests on the assumption that shareholder
interests are “similar if not identical”44 so even if the shareholders are acting in their own selfinterest, their actions for the most part would correspond with the interests of the other
minority shareholders as well. Holding these assumptions true, there would reasonably be no
need for fiduciary duties and limits on most shareholders. Although this may have been true
historically, today the rise of activist investors has critically changed the nature of the intrashareholder relationship and the question whether non-controlling shareholders should have a
duty of loyalty to the corporation, their fellow shareholders, and stakeholders will be explored
in depth later on.
Despite the corporation being composed of many constituencies with different,
perhaps even conflicting, interests, these same fiduciary protections and governance
protections are not granted to any other stakeholders45, who are only protected through
contract. While contract law may offer a degree of protection, it is apparent that the interests
of stakeholders are of lesser priority than shareholders and they lack access to a similar level
of insurance, despite their having considerable stake in the corporation’s future. Because
stakeholders typically do not have governance rights in the U.S.46, they are least able to voice
their concerns and affect change in the corporation. Stakeholders have the ability to demand
changes through contractual modifications and can exit without significant burden47 but their
level of investment in the company is likely to depend on their subjective perspective of the
corporation’s future trajectory.48 A company highly motivated by maximizing profits and
engages in more risky business strategy to generate high returns at the expense of capital
management, which may be appealing to shareholders, would likely be less palatable to
customers interested in a steady flow of inputs or for unsecured creditors. Both the board and
shareholders are able to make voting decisions that can effectively short-change their
stakeholders to no legal detriment to themselves.
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Given the often divergent interests between stakeholders and shareholders, one
interesting case study is that of the stakeholder acting as shareholder: the union shareholder.
Employees cannot generally have a significant voice in corporate affairs, but certain unions
who have large stakes in their companies are able to demand changes. What is most
interesting about this constituency when they exercise control, because they have the
influence of shareholders but a rationally different set of objectives, is that they choose to
further worker interests rather than pursue profit maximization. One notable example is the
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union protest of Safeway in 2003 and the
subsequent refusal of CalPERS, a major Safeway investor, to endorse the reelections of
directors and launch of a proxy contest. The President of CalPERS, Sean Harrigan, who was
also acting executive director of the UFCW union, was criticized for using his influence as a
significant investor to advance union goals. Harrigan led a union rally against Safeway and
demanded the CEO’s resignation in light of the company’s failure to fairly negotiate with
their employees. The institutional activism demonstrated here was criticized as being too
focused on labor interests rather than the creation of shareholder value. That this criticism is
levied is indicative of how strong a hold shareholder primacy has in corporate governance49;
shareholder value is taken as a good while social utility is deemed secondary. This is not
unique to the United States, but it is worth noting that corporate social responsibility is
emphasized greatly in other Western industrialized nations as typified by the mandatory
representation of stakeholder interests on their boards. Like shareholders, stakeholders have
their own objectives, and when given a chance, choose to advocate for their own interests.
Thus, when greater control is given to stakeholders, the corporation is more likely to advance
goals external to pure profit maximization.
b) Shareholder primacy: Should shareholder value be equated to entity value?

The evolution of shareholder primacy, which has fundamentally changed the face of
corporate governance, can be traced to the well-publicized and argued theory of shareholders
being the ultimate owners of the corporate entity.50 This theory that corporations exist to
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maximize share or market value51 has been the driver of the move towards greater shareholder
governance rights, which further protects shareholder interests, and this in turn has enabled
shareholders to demand and acquire even greater shareholder wealth. Using shareholder value
as an approximation for a corporation’s health or success essentially sanctions the notion that
shareholder value is equivalent to corporate value.52 Given that shareholder value is so
dominantly used as both an assessment tool and the ultimate corporate objective to attain, it
becomes necessary to ask if this treatment of shareholder value as equivalent to entity value is
a mistake and if it is, which value should boards aim to promote?
The difficulty of defining “value” should not be understated. Corporate law experts
continuously attempt to define it, but there’s no settled definition that is satisfactory to all
sides. The very delineation between shareholder value and entity value is a controversial
topic. Perhaps a good starting point is to examine the objectives of the shareholder base and
the corporation. Shareholders rationally have one goal in mind, personal or institutional return
maximization, whereas the goal of any corporation should be long-term survival, if not
success. While these goals are certainly not incompatible, high earnings for shareholders do
not require the ultimate survival of a given corporation they’re investing in.53 It is
understandable then that shareholders, who value high returns, place heavy emphasis on share
price and profitability, but then a corporation, whose survival is dependent on much more
complex factors than today’s market value, should also use a measurement of value more
complex than share price. Entity value should incorporate additional metrics: sustainability,
risk, corporate practices, social responsibility, productivity, employee and customer
satisfaction, reputation, etc. Share price cannot and does not reflect all of these other
variables, which contribute significantly to the long-run health of the corporation.54 Entity
value, as opposed to share value, implies the improvement of the welfare of the company, not
inconsistent with the interests of stakeholders or shareholders. But when managers and
directors primarily pursue increases in share price, they make the affirmative choice to
emphasize shareholder interests above the corporation’s as a whole. Fiduciary duties to the
corporation is distinct from the duty to the shareholder and by creating this veil between
51
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management and shareholders, it essentially allows the officers to make effective decisions to
benefit the corporation without heedlessly succumbing to pressure by investors. At best,
share price is an inaccurate and overly simplistic measure of entity value,55 but at worst using
it to measure success can lead boards to make decisions that destroy the long-term value of
the corporation.56
Shareholders today receive substantial deference in this country: fiduciary duty
protections, strong governance rights, and a significant amount of academic literature and
judicial opinions that advocate for shareholder primacy and share value maximization above
stakeholder or “enlightened” value maximization.57 Because shareholders are now able to
significantly influence corporations, the worry is that the other parties who have a long-term
stake in the company may be neglected to the detriment of the corporation’s health and social
utility. Corporate governance has reached a point in time when shareholder primacy may no
longer be a satisfactory answer and this next section will question whether today’s emphasis
on shareholder value as the foremost metric of corporate value is still compelling.
V. How have the changes in ownership affected corporate governance and performance?

a. Are board interests now too closely aligned with shareholders?
The original Berle-Means agency problem stemmed from the uneven distribution of
authority between dispersed shareholders and a board strongly controlled by management.
The worry was that the shareholders’ best interests would not be represented by their
fiduciaries. As the interests of directors were not properly aligned with their investors, they
would fail in their monitoring duties and management would be able to exercise substantial,
unchecked control. In attempts to resolve this agency concern, Berle and Means advocated
corporations adopt more shareholder-friendly policies.58 The modern influx of a large
institutional investor base and the implementation of substantive shareholder rights resulted in
a paradigm shift: shareholders are no longer passive or voiceless and now have the ability to
impact governance decisions. Institutional shareholders additionally possess institutional
influence and although the literature is mixed, there does seem to be a prevalence for
55
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institutional shareholders to vote in alignment with each other. Consequently, institutional
investors, especially when acting in concert, have real swaying power over the board. Over
the last two decades, institutional holders have pushed management to be more responsive to
the more immediate pressures of capital markets and to the electorate’s requests.59
Shareholders now have the power of the proxy vote, and have used their influence to elect
independent directors, direct executive compensation, de-stagger boards, and generally
implement more shareholder friendly business strategies, such as more frequent distribution
of dividends. Shareholders in the earlier part of the century likely also had demands, but the
difference is, that when institutional investors make demands today, they are more likely to be
met.60 One of the more significant and tangible consequences of institutional ownership is that
corporations are more sensitive than ever to shareholder wishes. While Berle and Means
perhaps might see this move towards shareholder compliance as a positive, there are
substantial risks to today’s evolved agency problem. The rise of unchecked shareholder rights
has created novel concerns surrounding board myopia.61
This brings the limited commitment problem to focus—due to informational
inefficiencies, today’s shareholders are rationally inclined to side with business and
governance decisions that result in value creation they can foresee occurring during their
holding period.62 Investing in longer-term strategies, while perhaps significantly more
beneficial to the corporate entity and other stakeholders, is often out of their purview. These
shareholders would thus want to protect their interests by influencing the board to likewise
adopt likewise more short-term inclined policies.63 The limited commitment problem, which
accounts for more complexities than the theory of “short-termism” does not deny that there
are institutional investors interested in longer-term investments, but emphasizes that it is
difficult for most shareholders to credibly value longer-term investment strategies and
governance policies. If it is taken as true that institutional shareholders typically focus on
quarterly earnings and on share price rather than on longer-term metrics because of their
incentives structure, then it is reasonable that they would not generally have objectives aimed
at improving long-term corporate performance simply because they will likely no longer be
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investors of the corporation once those policies take effect. If their own investment strategy is
only geared towards the near-future, it would lie outside of their purview to focus corporate
strategy on producing sustainable wealth.64
Understandably, Delaware corporate law is very clear and adamant on this issue—
outside of a Revlon situation65, the board’s fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation and
not to its shareholders. The law recognizes that the board should have the power, within
limits, to pursue its vision for the future, while taking into account what is best for both the
corporation and its shareholders.66 Contrary perhaps to activists’ opinions, the corporation is
not made up of only shareholders for the purpose of appeasing shareholders—there are other
important constituencies to consider: employees, trading partners, creditors, consumers, and
society.67 However, now that activist investors have begun to launch interventions to “fix”
corporations, the boards who are anxious to avoid public interventions or fearful of losing
their director positions, are arguably more likely to succumb to the shareholders’ demands,
regardless of whether enacting the changes will actually be beneficial to the corporation.68
The contemporary concern is if shareholders now have too much influence over boards, and
with executive compensation tied so closely to share value and corporate performance,
whether management interests are too closely aligned with shareholders’. The concern is that
eventually activists will simply elect fiduciaries who only “parrot the views of institutional
shareholders with a short-term focus.”69 Once the board and management are mere puppets of
their shareholders, it becomes extremely probable that they will put forward policies that are
geared less towards the corporation’s long-term survival. If a board is myopically focused on
pleasing the stockholders, it really diminishes the advantages created by the traditional
separation of ownership and control. The corporation’s other stakeholders and long-term
interests would tend to be neglected and this myopia would further create a cyclical problem:
stakeholders would be disinclined from investing with corporations that are too focused on
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pleasing shareholders.70 This disengagement of stakeholders would be a great disadvantage to
any corporation’s long-term firm value.
Despite these concerns, the ability of shareholders to have voice and effectuate control
should not be understated as a positive. The original fears that shareholder interests were not
taken into account by management and firm resources would be used inefficiently and
contrary to shareholders’ desires, has substantially subsided today. Institutional holders made
substantial pushes for shareholder rights and though the causation relationship cannot be fully
determined here, their influence on the shareholder rights movement should not be denied.
The caution should be on how substantial of an influence institutional investors can have on
governance decisions; as with most areas, there is wisdom in moderation—dangerously
narrow alignment is likely just as, or more, detrimental than substantial misalignment.71 In
order to preserve the separation of ownership and control, perhaps the growth of shareholder
rights and use of shareholder value as a proxy for firm value should not proceed unmitigated.

b. Do institutional holders sufficiently represent the interests of beneficiary owners?
A new agency concern that has emerged along with the prevalence of institutional
holders is the tension between these holders and their clients: the beneficial owners of the
shares. While there are activist shareholders amongst the institutional holders, i.e. a small
percentage of hedge funds, the vast majority of institutional investors are not activist or
perhaps, especially proactive in their duties as shareholders. The traditional story articulates
that it is more rational for institutional entities to divest their shares of a poorly managed
company than to invest their efforts in implementing new value-creation policies for the
corporation, even if said changes would be advantageous to the long-term holders.72 The
portfolio manager’s desire to generate quick profits for his fund, at the expense of the market,
is not similarly aligned to the long-term interests of beneficiary owners. Simply put, the
incentive structure that governs these institutions should not encourage the portfolio managers
to consider the best interests of the record holders. It is the limited commitment problem and
“short-termist” argument again, but it now pits the institutional intermediaries against the
beneficial owners as opposed to the board. Intermediary holding institutions have high
70
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turnover rates for their equity investments, and in obvious aspects should be considered
“traders” rather than “owners” of their investments.73 As in any agency relationship,
institutional holders owe fiduciary duties to vote their shares on behalf of the beneficial
owners’ interests74, or at the very least, not in conflict with their interests.75
The beneficial owners of these shares are generally ordinary people, who would likely
not meet the minimum wealth requirements to invest with hedge funds. These are individuals
who are typically using their investments primarily to increase their savings to fund retirement
or their children’s college education.76 As these goals are more long-term, they would tend to
also need their investments to be sustainable in the long-run. According to Chief Justice Strine
and Gilson, this is directly contrary to how the typical mutual fund or pension fund operates.
They appear to have short-term investment strategies, and tend to assess quarterly earnings
and use stock prices as indications of value.77 Institutional turnover rates have become
increasingly high and different studies posit that mutual funds will not hold the same or
similar shares in a portfolio by the next year.78 When institutional investors participate in
corporate governance decisions and vote, they tend to focus on issues such as executive
compensation, takeover defenses, and shareholder rights. While these issues may reflect the
institutions’ interests, they likely do not reflect the interests of the beneficiary owners’.79
These end-user investors would reasonably care about the ultimate sustainability of their
wealth, not quick profits in this year and upheaval in the next. Institutional investors are more
concerned with shareholder rights than if their portfolio corporations invest too little in future
growth and R&D, if they’re too highly leveraged, or if the business strategies are risky. But
these issues are of necessary consequence to the end-users—protecting the long-term
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prospects of firms is the only way to ensure market stability so their investments are still
viable in the future.
Because the record holders have a longer-term trajectory in front of them than their
investment intermediaries, critics have argued that these intermediary institutions need to
consider and genuinely align themselves with protecting those interests for long-term
corporate gain.80 It is especially dangerous given that institutional holders are able to affect
control and change at the levels they do. The corporations they influence would thereby also
be positioned to advance the institutional views on corporate growth and governance, rather
than views held by the beneficiary owners. This separation of ownership from owners here
necessarily creates a schism in control and ownership. When the institutional investors and
the true owners of corporations have divergent ambitions, it is up to the fiduciary to match
their actions to the beneficiary’s goals, so there is no stark conflict in interests.
This argument, however thorough, does not seem to present a complete picture—
despite having shorter holding periods than in the past, institutional investors do hold onto the
same investments for years. Many popular mutual funds have extremely low turnover rates—
Vanguard 500 Index Fund (VFINX), which has total net assets of $396.8 billion, has a
turnover rate of 3.4%.81 Although mutual funds and pension funds may be judged on their
relative performance and tend towards short-term determinants of value, they, like the
beneficiary owners, have equal incentive in the preservation of a strong capital market system.
If public corporations begin to fail because of this supposed institutional preference for shorttermism, this will necessarily harm the institutions as well as the beneficiary owners. Mutual
funds such as Fidelity and Vanguard can only thrive if their investors are satisfied and hopeful
in the future. The crux of the conflict seems not to be that institutional holders are all naturally
short-termist but that long-term governance interventions are not as advantageous in light of
strong exit options.82 Perhaps it would be of greater value to the beneficiary owners for their
intermediaries to partake in more interventions to ensure more optimal, long-term governance
approaches.
The recent politicization of pension funds adds an interesting dimension to this
intermediary agency problem:83 should portfolio managers be able to inject their subjective
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views when selecting investments if 1) the primary goal of fund management is to generate
financial returns for the beneficial owners and 2) their views differ from and are thus not
representative of the beneficial owners’? Fund managers are expected to maximize profits for
their beneficiary owners but when they insert additional concerns about the environment,
social utility, or corporate responsibility, and employ these variables in their investment
strategies, there is the risk they are diminishing returns for the sake of less quantifiable and
more political motivations. The recent 2015 bulletin from the Obama Administration seems to
suggest pension funds would not be breaching their fiduciary duties if they were to employ
such a selection process,84 but it can easily be imagined that funds which primarily invest in
socially sustainable companies may fail to create satisfactory returns for the beneficial
owners—in such an instance, it would be seem that they have failed to adequately represent
their clients’ interests in this agency relationship. Insiders criticize this practice and
contemplate that “pushing politics on retirement funds will destroy returns”85 and in fact, an
empirical study done by Daniel Bradley et al. shows that the political bias fund managers
demonstrate has had negative consequences on fund performance.86 Furthermore, fund
managers and beneficial owners are likely to have different opinions on these unsettled,
sometimes controversial issues; one can easily imagine blue collar workers having contrary
political perspectives on social and environmental issues to an MBA-educated portfolio
manager, who may also have different views from the pension’s board of trustees. Whose
views are the funds supposed to represent? Freely allowing fund managers to integrate their
investment strategies with personal political inclinations is challenging and creates a host of
new questions that are not easily answered with the current strata of case law.

c. Should activists be treated as controlling shareholders?
Hedge fund activism, whether perceived as value-enhancing or detrimental to the
corporate landscape, is a fundamental component of the present ownership and control
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paradigm.87 Activists publically engage with major Fortune 100 corporations and undoubtedly
influence substantially more corporations through private interactions.88 Even though hedge
funds rarely hold a controlling bloc of shares, their power and influence in a given corporation
can be equivalent to that of a majority or controlling shareholder.89 So although they might in
quantitative measurements be minority shareholders, in practice and in analysis of their
consequence on corporate governance matters, activists are arguably more comparable to
controlling shareholders. Their influence and ability to effectuate control did not arise in a
vacuum, however, they are only able to exercise control despite lacking the requisite
ownership because of their influence on other institutional shareholders.90
As discussed above, today’s shareholders play a significant role in influencing
corporate governance through a wide range of methods: shareholder proposals, private
negotiations with the board, campaigns, and proxy contests for board positions. When certain
shareholders are able to have this level of dominance in corporate governance affairs, without
needing a majority block, this clearly raises implications on the ongoing policy debates
surrounding the rights and duties of all shareholders. Their ability to essentially exercise
control, without having controlling ownership, has changed the landscape of U.S. corporate
law and begs the question if the traditional approach to the fiduciary relationship between
shareholders is out of date. If the majority of shareholder interests are homogenous and
aligned, then the ability of hedge funds to exercise control is not an issue. But assuming other
shareholders, whether institutional or retail, have divergent interests91 as they most certainly
do, then the activists’ ability to act as controlling shareholder ought to be reconsidered and
potentially limited. By failing to acknowledge the possible fiduciary obligations of minority
activists, corporate law is essentially allowing them to act on behalf of their own self-interests
and extract private gains at the possible expense of the other shareholders. The heterogeneity
of shareholder constituencies should be taken into account—even while institutional holders
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own approximately 70% of the largest 1000 corporations, retail investors still constitute a
substantial subsect of all shareholders and these investors may simply have different
investment strategies.92 If it is taken into consideration that hedge funds often has the power
of other institutional holders behind them, then it should be sufficient to say they, as
“minority” shareholders, have enough clout to push through their own specific, interested
agendas,93 regardless of the impact it may have on other minority investors.
The fundamental appeal of activists to other shareholders lies in their promise of
solving and alleviating the existing corporate deficiencies, whether related to managerial or
business strategy. The premise that allows activism to be so successful is rooted in the
shareholder belief that boards have somehow failed to maximize shareholder value and
intricately tied, is their confidence that activists would be better suited to resolving these
issues because they are shareholders themselves. Institutional shareholders similarly value
strong shareholder rights and when activists advocate on behalf of better governance or for
greater shareholder value maximization, it is reasonable for other shareholders to want to join
in. By promoting the further expansion of shareholder rights, activists can really draw in
support—but at what cost? Occasionally, by their mere threat of proxy contests and public
interventions, the board will acquiesce to their demands.94 Because of their ability to
influence their fellow shareholders and challenge the board, activists introduce a novel
problem into the ownership and control relationship. Their share ownership is rarely
controlling, but they’re able to extract the changes and gains they desire—their capacity to
control greatly outweighs their capital risk. Just as the moral hazard issues arose in the Berle
and Means generation with directors and management, history repeats itself and the same
issues are reborn in a new form. Activists can similarly use mechanisms for control to their
advantage, engage in self-dealing and can obtain private gains at the expense of other
shareholders or the corporate entity. The courts need to address this and perhaps import
fiduciary duties of loyalty onto activist minority shareholders before their influence can

92

When Carl Icahn initially gained control of a small percentage of Motorola’s stock, his hedge fund
immediately demanded the company fund a stock buyback by using all of its cash reserves. The activists’
devaluation of the future is clearly incompatible with any minority shareholders interested in a more long-term
investment horizon.
93
The caveat being of course, that institutional holders will not always acquiesce to activists. The herd-like
behavior is not necessarily a given as demonstrated by the Dupont- Icahn conflict. But the point is not that they
are successful a hundred percent of the time, the point is their probability of success is so high that it is a real
threat to other independent shareholders.
94
Last year’s instance of activism at General Motors initiated by Harry Wilson and four hedge funds is a prime
example—GM settled with the activists and avoided a public debacle. This will be further discussed in the joint
section.

25

become too deleterious towards other shareholders and stakeholders. The current climate of
corporate governance is gearing towards a stakeholder revolution,95 which would not be
sustainable under an activist “shareholder primacy at the expense of the corporate entity and
stakeholders” heritage.

V. Conclusion
The original reasons why there was a necessary separation of ownership and control
still exist today—it clearly enables efficiency, both in terms of business decision making but
also investment within capital markets. It assumedly allows the corporation to focus on more
than pure profitability and given today’s heavy emphasis on social responsibility, this is an
imperative advantage. Managerial moral hazard and concerns about board entrenchment,
contemporary problems of the Berle-Means era, continue to hound legal scholars today, but to
a much lesser extent, mainly due to the evolution of shareholder rights. Even staunch antiactivist advocates can acknowledge this growth as a substantial and necessary addition to U.S.
corporate law. But it is significant to also look beyond the rose-colored veneer and see that
certain consequences of this structural change, i.e. the rise of activism and board myopia, has
had dangerous implications on corporate governance. The effect of shareholders having more
influence and voice as a result of the past century’s ownership structural changes cannot be
said to be only positive. The worry is not so much that shareholders propose ineffective
operational or managerial strategies and can lower long-term corporate value, but that
everyone buys into the belief that the “indiscriminate expansion of shareholder rights”96 is the
optimal solution to the shareholder-board agency concerns. This in turns facilitates uncurbed
activism and creates a host of new problems not easily constrained under this new paradigm.
It remains to be seen how the separation of ownership and control can be answered without
creating further liabilities for the corporate entity, other stakeholders, and even the board and
shareholders themselves. Perhaps if shareholder primacy continues to rise unchecked by their
legal experts or corporate insiders, creating substantial costs along the way, regulators and the
courts will eventually need to step in. Presently, it seems there is still time for private ordering
to resolve this problem without regulatory intervention.
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As ownership structure has evolved significantly in the past fifty years, so too must the
nation’s corporate governance standards. The legal recommendations and solutions that were
appropriate decades ago are no longer relevant. This difficult question of control and
ownership really comes down to structuring the correct incentives. Despite the evolution of
corporate governance in America and the great strides U.S. corporations have made with
regards to shareholder rights, there remains no clear answer on how to reconcile this
relationship and construct the right incentives so the interests of shareholders, management,
and stakeholders can merge. It begs the question: to what extent is this an American problem
or a universal story? Perhaps by examining this issue in the context of another corporate law
jurisdiction, with different values, history, and players, it will enable the US to see what a
sustainable governance solution would look like.

C. German Section
This part of paper is concerned with the structure of the German economy between 1950 and
2016 and its development. For the second half of the 20th century, the German economy was
dominated by an enormous nexus of cross-interlocking of investments and a trust-like group of
decision-makers. This specific kind of organized capitalism is what scholars called
“Deutschland AG (Aktiengesellschaft - Germany Inc.)” to emphasize the close cooperation
between different corporations in different economic sectors that let the German economy
appear like one giantess corporation.97 To understand this nexus of close cooperation, this paper
will firstly examine the history and the system that resulted in the foundation of “Deutschland
AG”. Secondly the changes of the economic circumstances and the legal system in Germany
during the 1990s will be described before thirdly, the situation today will be presented. The last
part will summarize the paper.
I. Development of German corporate ownership
The German economy, after its disastrous breakdown at the end of World War II, grew in the
relatively peaceful decades and a period of an ongoing European integration to be today’s fourth
strongest economy in the world.98 The German economy herein appears to be characterized by
strong continuity, as many companies (or their predecessors) listed in the Deutscher Aktien
Index (DAX; German Stock Index) were founded during the 19th century. Among them are well
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known, worldwide operating companies like Siemens (1847), Bayer (1863), BASF (1865),
Continental (1871), Linde (1879), Daimler (1890), Thyssen/Krupp (1867 Thyssen/1811
Krupp), as well as Commerzbank (1870), Deutsche Bank (1870) and Allianz (1890). With the
oldest still existing corporation, Merck which’s history can be traced back to the year 1668,99
that brings the average age of the DAX-listed companies up to 128 years.100 Throughout those
companies’ existence, however, the economic circumstances worldwide have changed. A more
and more globalized world and the ongoing digital revolution changed the way in which
business is done. Besides the changes in corporate ownership, the late 1990s have had a mayor
impact. Accompanied by significant changes in the German legislation, German companies
experienced a still ongoing internationalization of ownership, while especially German private
investors seem to avoid investment in shares. The history and development of what used to be
the economic construct of “Deutschland AG”, the economic and legislative forces that
catalyzed its end as well as the corporate ownership structures in the year 2016 will be the issues
dealt with on the following pages.
1. Organized capitalism – principles of “Deutschland AG”
After the end of World War II and the “end” of the Allied control over Germany in 1949, the
German economy experienced a time of enormous economic growth today known as the
“Wirtschaftswunder” (“economic miracle”). Germany’s industry, especially the coal, steel and
electricity, was caught in a time of reconstruction and reorganization and in need of financial
support. The consequence is what some call a continuity of the economic structure of the
German Empire or the Republic of Weimar101 and the beginning of “Deutschland AG”.
a. Banks, companies and politics – founding fathers of “Deutschland AG”?
The foundation of the success of “Deutschland AG” is – in contrast to the Anglo-American
liberal capitalism – a form of organized capitalism102. Unlike the liberal capitalism, organized
capitalism is organized by one or more driving forces. Two examples of this form of capitalism
are the French state driven and the German “Rhinish capitalism”103. While the French system
is based on the regulative power of the central government,104 the Rhinish capitalism is
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characterized by a strong cooperation between companies (accompanied by the trade unions),
the financial sector and politics.105
The general idea behind the concept of “Deutschland AG” has been a system of cooperation
and control in opposition to a solely market driven one. Within said system, the financial sector
provides financial support for German companies while the capital markets did not play an
important role.106 In a supporting function, legislative and executive powers in Germany
provided an assisting legal framework.
The system of close cooperation between those three actors resulted in a common benefit for
all three: German financial institutions like Deutsche Bank, but also Commerzbank and – back
in the days – Dresdener Bank as well as Allianz grew and joined the ranks of world’s biggest
financial institutes with a large scale of industrial shares and consequently influence.
Additionally, the German tax legislation provided several benefits with regards to institutional
investments that will be discussed in the second part of this paper.
Companies benefitted from their “Hausbank”, meaning that there are a mere one or two
financial institutions providing the financial support for any activity without the need of
acquiring money from the financial markets.107 Additionally, the “Hausbank” has a substantive
inside in the company’s business which speeds up the process. The trade unions supported the
system of “Deutschland AG” as its stakeholder approach supported them in claiming their slice
of the pie.
The government provided a legal framework that supported the institutional system of
“Deutschland AG”. Certain tax reliefs have been implemented as well as rules for corporate
governance such as voting caps, multiple-voting shares or proxy voting.108 By supporting the
system, the government benefitted from a certain stabilization of the national economy. As a
result, the government prevented dramatic changes in the German ecomony and could be
assured of a cooperative work of the leading German corporations which guaranteed a lower
unemployment rate and a stable tax income. Although the benefits for the government were less
substantive than for companies or banks, a well developing and financed economy is an
essential interest for political leaders.
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b. Cross-ownership and the “Festung Deutschland”
One main aspect, which formed the core of the German system, has been cross-participation.
In 1996, 60 of the 100 biggest companies in Germany were involved in a system of crossshareholding.109 Unlike other systems of cross-participation, the German economy did not
consist of several different groups that were isolated from each other, but of one gigantic group.
The center of this nexus was formed by financial institutions, mainly Deutsche Bank and
Allianz as well as Münchner Rück and Dresdener Bank.110 At its peak, this nexus of crossparticipation contained more than 168 different connections between Germany’s 100 biggest
companies.111 But financial institutions did not just base their influence on their own assets,
since 1870 they used shares owned by their costumers to exercise their clients’ voting rights
(proxy voting).112 These additional voting rights provided the acting financial institutions with
a substantive power in the general meeting of shareholders.
Besides the investments from the core (financial institutions) to the edge (industrial companies
among others), an outstanding feature of “Deutschland AG” has been the strong connection
between the financial institutions in the German financial sector. Over decades, Deutsche Bank
and Müchner Rück held shares of Allianz, while Allianz held shares of Deutsche Bank and
Münchner Rück.113
The term “Festung Deutschland” (Fort Germany) described the way by which German
companies, as well as the German market, has been described by foreign investors.114 The
codified regime for corporate groups (“Konzernrecht”) and the cooperation as explained above,
made it almost impossible for foreign investors to gain control over German companies. A
striking example for the way in which “Deutschland AG” defended its members is the attempt
of the Italian tire manufacturer Pirelli to acquire the German automotive manufacturing
company Continental. In the early 1990s, the fifth biggest tire manufacturer Pirelli attempted a
hostile takeover of world’s number four, Continental.115 Although there was a certain
appreciation for Pirelli’s move in the beginning, in the end a consortium – including several
financial and industrial companies – under the leadership of Deutsche Bank and in alliance with
the worker’s representatives and the State of Lower Saxony’s government fought a three year
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battle to protect Continental. Finally, Pirelli had to end its ambitions and sold its shares to the
consortium.116
Although an institutional investment in Continental was not in the (financial) best interest of
the companies aligning to end Pirelli’s hostile takeover, but this concept was based on a balance
of interests and the protection of the closed German economic system, instead of high dividend.
The involved institutions only had a strategic and less of a financial interest.117
2. Turning points – the erosion of “Deutschland AG”
While dealing with the reasons for the development of and its end, the question always accrues
whether market related or legislative changes have been the major force that drove forward the
erosion of “Deutschland AG”. The following part of the paper will show, that not one but both
aspects came to a cumulative effect that catalyzed the end of “Deutschland AG”
a. Market related changes
The last decade of the 20th century marked the transition to a new era. The end of the cold war,
the German reunification and the early beginning of what is called the fourth industrial
revolution118 sped up the ongoing globalization. The breakdown of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) presented capitalism as superior to the form of communism the USSR
represented.
The new opportunities of international investments and the growing financial market worldwide
led to a dissent about the orientation of German financial institutions. While many established
bank managers in the boards of Deutsche Bank or Allianz retired, a new generation of bank
managers struggled to move the focus of investments from institutional investments in
industrial companies to mergers and acquisitions.119 To compete in that field and to be
acknowledged as a serious service provider, institutional investments in various companies are
counter-productive. Being service provider for company A while holding a considerable
amount of shares of company B – which company A wants to acquire – easily leads to a conflict
of interests. Additionally, a financial institutions customer would bare the risk that information
about the takeover plans could be passed on to the corporation it aims for. This reorientation

116

Baums, p. 18.
Streek/Höpner, S. 22.
118
BmBF.
119
Streek/Höpner, p. 30.
117

31

could be seen shortly after the Pirelli/Continental incident in the case of the attempt of Fried.
Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp to take over Thyssen AG and in the Holzmann crisis.
aa. Thyssen/Krupp
In 1997, Deutsche Bank, among others, supported the Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp (five
years after Krupp AG succeeded in taking over Hoesch AG in one of the first hostile takeovers
in Germany) in their attempt to take over Thyssen AG. While Klaus Breuer from Deutsche
Bank explained their efforts as “Inverstmentbanking am Hochreck” (“investmentbanking at the
high bar”), the workers representatives fought against the takeover and the state government
finally prohibited the takeover.120 In the end, Thyssen AG and Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-Krupp
negotiated a fusion of both companies that took place November 1997.
bb. The Holzmann crisis
In 1999, Philipp Holzmann AG hoped to restructure its enormous debts. Unlike before, the
banks decided that an investment would not be in their best interest. Again politics, led by
former chancellor Gerhard Schröder, stepped in accusing the financial sector to favor their own
financial benefit instead of the wellbeing of employees and the overall interest of the German
economy. Because of the threat to their reputation and the massive public pressure, several
financial institutions helped financing the lately futile attempt of reconstruction.

As it can be seen in both cases, the financial institutions more and more dissociated themselves
from the principles of “Deutschland AG”. While in 1992 the impulse to protect Continental
came from the financial institutions, the growing importance of the capital markets and the
reorientation of the financial sector led to a point, where a joint action in the interest of the
stakeholders and German society could only be forced by a massive threat of the political
powers and the syndicates. With one of the three main actors of the system “Deutschland AG”
breaking away, the attempt of saving Philipp Holzmann AG can be seen as the last (forced)
defense of the “Festung Deutschland”.121
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b. Changes in German legislation
The following paragraph will focus on legal regulations that supported the system of
“Deutschland AG”. Within that analysis, changes in the German legislation made before the
end of World War II will not be considered.
aa. German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG) 122 and the “Lex Abs”
One of the first attempts of the German legislator has been the limitation of mandates in
supervisory boards. The huge voting power of financial institutions (as described above) gave
them the opportunity to elect their own representatives into several supervisory boards.
Although it is not unusual for institutional investors to be represented in supervisory boards,
the network of cross-ownership in the German economic system resulted in a relatively small
group having a lot of influence in the leading German companies. A striking example for this
concentration of power has been Hermann Josef Abs, former Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
of Deutsche Bank. Besides his personal influence on the former German chancellor Konrad
Adenauer, Hermann Josef Abs has been elected into 24 different supervisory boards at the same
time, serving as president or vice-president in 22 cases.123 Without judging his capacities, the
enormous concentration of power, considering that the companies were among the Germanys
biggest, led to a trust like position for Hermann Josef Abs and his colleagues. To limit the
influence of the few and to ensure the quality of the work of members of supervisory boards,
the German legislator in 1965 codified in § 100 para. 2 sent. 1 n° 1 AtkG124 that the maximum
amount of mandates in supervisory boards is limited to ten. This did not break the influence of
the financial sector on the German industry, but it extended the number of involved board
members and helped ensure the functionality of supervisory boards.
bb. German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) 125
The WpHG in §§ 21 ff. regulates the voting right disclosure obligation for shareholders. Since
the Transparency Directive Implementation Act126, this obligation refers to shareholders who
own more than 3 per cent of the voting rights in a corporation. They also need to inform the
national supervisory authority whenever they reach 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 or 75 per cent of
the voting rights. Although shares have always been and should still be an opportunity to
invest anonymously (therefore the French stock corporation is still called “société anonyme
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(SE)”), other investors, as well as the government and the society, have an interest in knowing
the block shareholders, as they have a huge influence on corporations that may be essential
for the national economy.127
cc. German Corporation Tax Act (Körperschaftssteuergesetz – KStG)128
The German tax law supported the cross-participation in the German economy for several
decades. Investors benefitted from very low standards concerning disclosure obligations of
blocks of shares they held and the fact that dividend payouts coming from shareholding blocks
higher than 25 per cent were tax free.129 Once a block over 25 per cent was owned, corporations
hesitated to sell them even if there were not very profitable. The main reason for this was the
tax of such investments of over 25 per cent.130 This changed when the German government
reorganized the Corporation Tax Act in 2002.131 The new § 8b para. 2 KStG declared that profits
made from sale of shares will not be considered in taxation. This gave financial institutions the
opportunity to sell the blocks of shares and reduced the amount of blocks of shares held in
German corporations.
dd. Newly implemented institutions
In the progress of reorganizing the German economy, several institutions have been installed to
exercise oversight of the German economy: the government commission “German corporate
governance codex” and the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority).
aaa. Government Commission “German Corporate Governance Codex (GCGC)”
The government commission “German Corporate Governance Codex”, consisting of
government representatives, workers, employers and scientists, was founded in August 2001 to
implement the GCGC.132 Although the character of the GCGC is non-binding, the advice given
are very well taken by the German corporations.133 The legislative projects that were
recommended by the commission and have been undertaken by the government will be
discussed in the paragraph for the respective law.
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Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin)
The BaFin, founded by the Act Establishing the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz, FinDAG)134 in 2002, combines the three former German
oversight authorities for insurances, securities trade and credit system under one
administration.135 Today, the BaFin is part of the European System of Financial Supervision
ESFS (Europäisches Finanzaufsichtsystem).
ee. Company Control and Transparency Act (Kontroll – und Tranzparenzgesetz
KonTraG)
The KonTraG136 in 1998 is one of the most important changes is the history of German Stock
Corporation Law. It has been intended to implement good corporate governance to modernize
German stock corporations and to attract new (foreign) investors. The main points for this paper
are a new regulation concerning proxy-voting rights, the prohibition of any limitations to voting
rights for shareholders and the prohibition of shares with multiple voting rights.
aaa. Proxy voting rights
Proxy voting rights play an important role to guarantee a sufficient amount of voting shares
being represented at the annual shareholders’ meeting. Especially today, where shareholders
are spread throughout the globe, it is often difficult for shareholders to attend the meeting.
Furthermore, the proxy voting rights give shareholders the opportunity to stay anonymous if
preferred.137
The first use of proxy voting rights is dates back into 1870, when banks used the shares in their
depos without informing the original shareholder.138 After the prohibition of such measures in
1884, financial institutions implemented their right to use the voting right in their general terms
and conditions.139 Since 1937, the proxy given to the bank has already been limited to a
maximum duration of 15 months.140 The KonTraG added a prohibition to exercise voting rights
in the case where the financial institution owns (directly or indirectly) 5% of the corporation
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and obligation, to inform their customer about alternative ways of representation at the
shareholders’ meeting.141
bbb. The prohibition of limitations to voting rights
Voting rights are codified in § 134 AktG. Before the implementation of KonTraG, corporations
had the option to set a certain limit to a shareholders voting rights no matter how many shares
he owns. This limitation of voting rights has been one of the core instruments in the system of
“Deutschland AG” to ensure the status quo in German corporations and to defend them from
“foreign infiltration”.142 Under that regime, a hostile takeover is nearly impossible and (foreign)
investors have no chance to expend their influence and control on the corporation. To promote
the German economy and to attract new investors, the limitation of voting rights has been
prohibited for listed corporations. Because of the strong position of family run businesses, nonlisted corporations are excluded from that restriction.143
ccc. Shares with multiple voting rights
The rightfulness of shares with multiple voting rights has been discussed since the early
1920s.144 The shareholder benefits from a higher voting power irrespective of his financial
investment.145
The emission of new shares with multiple voting rights has been forbidden by law in 1937
except for shares that were emitted with ministerial approval in the case of a “societal
interest”.146 The amendment of 1965, although highly discussed, approved this regulation,
despite the fact, that the ministerial approval had to be based on a “predominant economical
issue”.147 The dispute about shares with multiple voting rights remained, until the German
legislator with the KonTraG finally prohibited them.148 The remaining shares lost their multiple
voting rights after a five year transitional period in 2003, if they were not approved by the
shareholders’ meeting, what never happened.149
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ff. German Public Transparency and Disclosure Act (Transparenz – und
Publizitätsgesetz, TransPubG) 150
The TransPubG was the second major change in the German legal system with regards to
corporate governance. It is mainly based on the work of the government commission “German
Corporate Governance Codex.151 The TransPubG improved the information rights of the
supervisory board. The changed § 90 para. 1 AktG states that the management board is obliged
to comment on changes to plans presented to the supervisory board in the past. This right to be
informed has been implemented to guarantee a certain level of knowledge and understanding
for all members of the supervisory board, so that they can effectively supervise the management
board’s work.152
The core provision implemented by TransPubG, however, is the obligation for corporations to
state each year which recommendations in the GCGC they follow and in the case where they
do not, explain why (§ 161 AktG). As the recommendations of the GCGC are non-binding, the
principle of “comply or explain” is used set corporations under a certain pressure. Since these
reports need to be published (§ 285 n° 16 and § 325 para. 1 sent. 1 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB,
Comercial Code)153) the shareholders (and the general public) are able to read and question the
boards decisions.
3. “Deutschland AG” and the 21st century
With the beginning of the 21st century, the structure of German corporate ownership changed.
The erosion of “Deutschland AG” and the economic and legal changes discussed above paved
the way for a growing influence of foreign investors in Germany. The following part will
analyze the growing influence of foreign investors in the DAX (1), the position of family run
businesses in Germany’s economy (2) and the situation of German private investors (3).
a. Foreign investors and the DAX
Analyzing the ownership structures in Germany, it can be seen that the “Festung Deutschland”
has fallen. The DAX154 has never been more international. At the end of 2014, 59 per cent of
the traded shares were hold by investors residing in a foreign country; compared to 45 per cent
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in 2005155 and 35.5 per cent in 2001.156 Within that group, European investors represent the
biggest group with 27 per cent, followed by investors from North America with 21 per cent.157
When it comes to corporate ownership, the situation concerning foreign investors differs
significantly for the different corporations listed in the DAX. In ten corporations (Deutsche
Börse, Linde, Infineon, Lanxess, Bayer, Merck, Adidas, Allianz, Daimler and Münchener
Rück) foreign investors held more than one third of the tradable shares.158. The number of
corporations with a German investor’s majority has decreased to nine (Fresenius SE, Deutsche
Telekom, Deutsche Bank, Fresenius Medical Care, Volkswagen, Continental, Lufthansa, BMW
and Henkel).159
But not just has the origin of investors in the DAX changed. While the era of “Deutschland
AG” was dominated by strategic investments and the principle of controlling, leading and
organizing the German economy, the amount of strategic shareholding blocks in DAX
corporations has declined. In 2001, the average percentage of the biggest shareholder block was
28.89 per cent (31.10 per cent only considering the 18 corporations that still are DAX-listed).160
In 13 years, that average has declined to 17.91 per cent (respectively 15.47 per cent).161 Still,
there are three corporations in which the biggest block-shareholder controls more than 50 per
cent of the corporation (Merck, Baiersdorf, Volkswagen) and another six with more than 25 per
cent (BMW, Continental, Deutsche Telekom, Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius SE, Henkel).
Referring to the important role of financial institution like Deutsche Bank or Allianz, it is
interesting to see that among today’s block-shareholders there is almost no financial institution.
Only in two cases (Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom), the major block-shareholder is the
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), a state-owned bank founded in 1948 to finance the
restructuration of Germany (§ 2 Gesetz über die Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau,
KredAnstWiAG)162.163 This shareholding, however, only exists due to the fact that Deutsche
Post and Deutsche Telekom have been state owned companies themselves before being
privatized.
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b. The strong position of family companies
Family owned companies have always been very important for the world’s economy and they
still are. According to the Global Family Business Index, published by the University of St.
Gallen, the 500 largest family owned businesses generate 6.5 trillion United States Dollar
(USD), employ 21 million people and have an average sales volume of 13 billion USD.164
Germany ranks second as country of origin with 87 registered family owned businesses among
the largest 500.165 According to a definition given by the European Commission (EC), a listed
company is a family owned business if the person who established or acquired the firm (share
capital) or their families or descendants possess 25 per cent of the decision-making rights
mandated by their share capital.166 Following this definition, Baiersdorf, BMW, Continental,
Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius, Henkel, and Volkswagen are family businesses listed in the
DAX. In general, in 12 DAX-listed corporations, the founding families or other family owned
corporations represent the biggest block-holder.167 In the field of strategic long term
investments – which equals approximately 20 per cent of the investments in the DAX – families
represent 52 per cent of those investments168.
c. German private investors
With only 8.4 million Germans (13.1%) owning shares, Germans still have a certain aversion
concerning investments in the stock exchange market.169 Although Germans knows about the
profit ratio of shares (29 %)170 and do see shares as long term investment (36 %)171, they are
also of the opinion that investments in shares are risky (44 %)172 and that they require a profound
knowledge 74 %)173. The study also differentiates between the answers given by shareholders
and non-shareholder and non-surprisingly, the attitude of shareholders towards shares is, but
only a bit, more positive than of non-shareholders. The question arises why Germans hesitate
to invest in the German stock-listed corporations although their performance worldwide is
stable. One reason, surely, is the more conservative way of German investments that is part of
the German mentality174 and their lack of experience concerning investments in the stock
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exchange markets, as mentioned in the study. One significant factor surely still is the experience
of German private investors with the shares of “Deutsche Telekom AG”. In 1996, one year after
its privatization, “Deutsche Telekom AG” shares were traded at the German stock exchange in
Frankfurt. The emission has been accompanied by an enormous campaign presenting the shares
as “Volksaktie”, a share dedicated to the German people instead of institutional shareholders
(as happened in previous privatizations like Volkswagen).175 The success of the campaign
triggered a boom in the capital markets and many Germans invested in the former state owned
corporation as it has been presented as being sound and solid.176 In three different emission
phases, the price for the “T-Aktie” (T-share; Telekom share) rose and peaked in the year 2000
at 103,50 Euro per share, before it fell enormously.177 After many investors lost a lot of money
and several investigations, the “T-Aktie” and its rise and fall are still in the collective
consciousness of many Germans and symbolize their view on how the capital market works.
II. Conclusion
To conclude all the aspects presented so far, one can surely say that, especially in the early days
of the reconstruction of the German economy, the idea of “Deutschland AG” and the principles
of an organized capitalism helped rebuild and strengthen the Germany economy.
A positive view on “Deutschland AG” would highlight, that the stakeholder approach helped
ensure a constant economic growth for a social benefit. The nexus of cross-ownership and the
thereby resulting overseen and guided marked competition helped many German corporations
to compete internationally and survive, even in times of economic crisis like the 1970s energy
crisis. As the financial institutions coordinated the corporations’ policies as parts of the
supervisory boards, a centralized government-made corporate governance has not been
necessary, because the control and supervision has been guaranteed by the “management board
of Deutschland AG”.
From a more negative point of view, one could argue that the main actors of “Deutschland AG”
restored the oligarchic reign of an elite like in the system they grew up with, the monarchial
and strictly hierarchic economic system of the German empire. While the allied forces under
the lead of the United States tried to break the rule of monopolist corporations like the IGFarben, the founding fathers of “Deutschland AG” rethought this rule in slightly changed
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conditions. Instead of physically recreating corporations like IG-Farben, they created that nexus
that provided them with enough control of key corporations to lastly control almost the entire
German economy. An ironic aspect of that restoration of hegemonic rule has been the
institutional center of that reign. Like the IG-Farben, whose former headquarters are located in
Frankfurt and are now part of Goethe University, the new heart of the oligarchic rule used to be
the financial district in Frankfurt.
In the end, as often, the truth lies somewhere between both ultimate positions. Surely critics of
the “Festung Deutschland” were right, the protective German system hindered the development
of free and liberal financial marked. Surely, the German stock market did not play an important
role till the end of the 20th century and surely the nexus of cross-participations helped covering
the boards’ work and led to a nontransparent system where a few important managers like
Hermann Josef Abs, Berthold Beitz or . But one ought not to forget the disastrous situation of
the German economy after WWII, when this nexus helped protect the economy and ensured the
balance between the interests of corporations, financial institutions and the trade unions. In the
end the question how the German economy would have evolved without the protective
measures of “Deutschland AG” cannot be answered. Since the German economy was not capital
marked focused before the war, a transition from one system to the other would have almost
certainly been more problematic than the transition step by step, as happened from 1998 on.
Thinking about what has to come in the upcoming years, the numbers presented concerning the
participation of residents in the German stock market is alarming. The survey of the DAI shows
that the lack of interest in investments mainly results in a lack of knowledge and experience.
Keeping in mind the precarious situation of the social security – especially the pension scheme
– the government should take educational measures to raise the activity of citizens. Not only
are long-term investments an important aspect in securing a certain wealth for the pensions, the
conservative investments in savings, bank books or bonds with their low interest rates, are not
adequate to compete with the inflation. Without knowing, monetary assets are wiped out and
the Germans miss the opportunity to participate in “their” economy’s success.

To conclude, the changes made have definitely been necessary to materialize the European
Single Market. Obviously a closed economy that concentrates on defending the status quo
against foreign – including European – investors is incompatible with the idea of a progressing
European integration progress. Therefore, the changes of the last two decades do not only
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guarantee a successful transition into a more capital marked focused economy but have also
been important for the European Union. Nevertheless it remains of the utmost importance to
keep in mind the core principles of the German social market economy system. Key aspects,
such as a certain focus on stakeholder values and the strong position of German trade unions,
should be guarded to guarantee social stability. Therefore, the ongoing evolution of the German
economy should not be ending in an assimilation with the Anglo-American system, but a newly
defined path that combines the best characteristics of both systems.
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D. Comparative Part
I. Introduction
In the combined section of the paper, the present state of corporate ownership and
control for each country will be shortly summarized and compared. In an attempt to
demonstrate the typical structure of share ownership in both countries, two exemplary, model
corporations will be compared. The authors selected General Motors and Volkswagen as two
analogous automobile manufacturers to analyze and discuss.
II. Current Scope/Status quo
1. US ownership structure
Unlike many other Western and Latin American countries, public companies in the
U.S. typically do not have a single controlling shareholder or small group of shareholders
with corresponding voting control and equity holdings.178 Similarly unique to the U.S. is the
lack of government ownership of public corporations. While the government has soleownership of a number of corporations in the U.S.,179 it is extremely rare for a corproation to
have both private and government ownership of its equity holdings.180 In the few instances the
government did obtain equity ownership of a company, notably after the recession, they were
reluctant to do so and promised to sell their stakes as quickly as possible.181 Americans have a
strong aversion to government ownership of private industry and there is criticism levied at
both the government and the corporate entity when ownership is in state hands.
Despite the slow growth period following the recession, American citizens and financial
funds mostly remain faithful to the capital market system. According to Gallup’s annual
Economy and Finance survey conducted in April 2015, about 55 percent of Americans are
invested in stock market either in the form of individual stocks, stock mutual funds, or a
retirement fund. 182 Stock ownership is still at lower levels than it was before the financial crisis
with 65 percent of national adults owning stocks in 2007.183 The largest drop was for those in
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the lower middle class, with incomes of $30000-$74,999 from 72 percent in 2007 to 56 percent
ownership.184
As noted above, the trend from substantial dispersed, retail ownership in the Berle and
Means generation has drastically shifted to concentrated institutional ownership today. In 1950,
institutional holdings of total outstanding equity was only about 6.1 percent, by 2009 that figure
has increased to 50.6 percent, which is actually a slight decrease after a peak of 53.3 percent in
2005.185 The institutional ownership of the Top 1,000 US corporations—essentially the most
efficiently traded stocks—is even more substantial at 73 percent, with institutional ownership
peaking at 76.3 percent for the Top 251-500 US companies.186 Towards the end of 2014, the
top fifty largest institutions decreased their equity investments by about $100 billion, only
equating to about a 0.9 percent decline overall due to the tremendous size of these investors.187
Because 80 percent of total institutional ownership is in domestic corporations,188 most of the
sales in 2014 were also likely of US shares. The aggregate concentration of foreign institutional
ownership should not be understated—most Western nations, including Japan, have ownership
of US equity in at least comparable numbers to their ownership of their own domestic shares,
if not more.189 In fact, the total holdings of Germany’s largest institutions constitute a 29.22
percent ownership of German corporations and a 35.54 percent of American corporations.190
The U.S. institutions owning the most equity are pension funds (20.7%) and open-end
mutual funds (20.4%).191 Given that these institutions are the primary intermediaries for
beneficiaries of 401Ks and other retirement funds, their quantitative dominance and prevalence
in the equity markets is understandable. What is interesting about these figures is how
numerically insignificant hedge fund ownership; of the 6,000 hedge funds, the ten largest have
about $280 billion under management.192 Compared to the approximate $1.2 trillion controlled
separately by the ten largest mutual funds and the ten largest pension funds,193 the amount of
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hedge fund ownership seems inconsequential, which makes their often-times successful
activism all the more remarkable.
2. German ownership structure
The German economy today is dominated by institutional shareholders. 65 per cent of
all shareholders belong to that group. The institutional shareholders are followed by strategic
investors (20 per cent) and private individual investors (13 per cent). The remaining 2 per cent
remain to brokers or banks.194
More than half of all strategic investors (52 per cent) are families or foundations. The
German state still holds 18 per cent of those long term investments – mainly in former state
owned corporations like Volkswagen, Deutsche Telekom and Deutsche Post – while foreign
state funks follow with 9 per cent.
Generally, foreign investors extended their activities in the German economy, especially
in the DAX. AS mentioned, at the end of 2014, 59 per cent of the traded DAX-shares were hold
by investors residing in a foreign country; compared to 45 per cent in 2005195 and 35.5 per cent
in 2001.196 The top investor in the DAX is the Norwegian state fund Norges Bank Investment
Management, followed by Blackrock. Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management Investment
GmbH is the first German investor and ranked seventh.
Although international investors successfully entered the former closed system of the
German economy, the characteristic of dominating block shareholder is still existing. From a
social but also economical point of view, the number of only 8.4 million Germans (13.1%)
owning shares, seems to mark a negative characteristic for the German capital market system.
The number even declined in from 2013 to 2014 by 2 per cent. Besides their financial loss
because of the inequality of interest rates and the inflation, their potential to contribute to the
German financial market remains unused.
With 87 registered family businesses among the largest 500 worldwide, Germany ranks second
and continues the successful story of German family businesses that not just play a minor part
in Germany’s economy but an active and prominent role even in the DAX.197 This influence is
even stronger in the other German indices.
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3. Comparative analysis
The global investor profile showed that retail investors globally are generally risk-averse
with almost half (45%) of investors preferring low risk/low return assets.198 This has generally
translated to a short-term investing approach. 46% of investors prefer outcomes within 1-2 years
and only about 12% preferring longer approaches with payout within 15-20 years.199 There
seems to be some disconnect between all retail investors’ expected return and their attitude to
risk/investment time horizon. About 42% of North American investors prefer low-risk/low
return assets, Europe is even higher at 48.6%.200 The same post-recessionary risk-aversion
seems to apply to institutional investors as well. As their portfolios clearly indicate, institutional
holders in the world’s largest economies all have placed significant faith in the United States
equity markets.201 Generally considered a safe bet, the US offers to both domestic and global
investors, at least in appearance if nothing more, confidence in the market. As indicated by the
limited number of retail investors in Germany and the substantial investment in US corporations
by German institutions, investor confidence generally is significantly lower than in the US.
Over the past few decades, Germany and the US have both seen the mammoth rise of
institutionalism. While certain ownership concerns are unique to Germany—significant
ownership by families and the state, general retail aversion to investment—both nations share
in a newly developed concentration of ownership that raises questions of control. The same
arguments advocating institutional ownership cite better monitoring of management, overall
improved corporate performance, and greater shareholder ability to demand value
maximization. This theory of institutionalism fails to present a complete picture of the classical
problem of corporate governance—a unique set of agency costs presented by a separation of
ownership and control necessarily arises here. In Germany, the large share blocks held by a few
shareholders, notably family controlled companies, create a worry about minority shareholders
that is less obviously relevant in the US picture of ownership.202 Compared to the US, the
regulatory environment creates generally a lower cost of holding larger control blocks. In an
effort to protect minority shareholders and other stakeholders, the German system imposes a
duty of loyalty on each shareholder towards the corporate entity, stakeholders, and other
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shareholders, but is especially applicable to dominant shareholders. 203 One specific application
of this general philosophy that the company should serve the interests of all stakeholders is
demonstrated by the use of two-tiered boards.204 Germany has mechanisms in place to protect
minority and stakeholder interest that would not be diminished by the presence of a controlling
shareholder. This “equal treatment” of all shareholder and stakeholder interests is less
observable in the US, but this can primarily be a consequence of the insubstantial number of
controlling shareholders in the equity markets. Since various state and federal regulatory
burdens make obtaining and holding controlling blocks more costly in comparison205, there has
not really been a tradition of having controlling shareholders in the US nor the consequent equal
treatment doctrine to protect against them. In light of concerns about hedge fund activism and
the considerable influence they are able to exercise, despite not having controlling blocks,
perhaps it is also time for the US to adopt a similar philosophy in which the “controlling”
shareholders are pushed to act with equal concern for the corporate entity, other shareholders,
and stakeholders.
II. Comparison exemplary corporations
1. Volkswagen AG
Based on the idea to build a car affordable for everyone, the engineer Ferdinand Porsche
in 1934 created a prototype. To manufacture this car, the Nazi-government ordered the
construction of Europe’s biggest car factory. After World War II, the British military command
took control over Volkswagen (back then renamed Wolfsburg Motor Works) and in 1949, the
military command assigned it to the newly formed state of Lower Saxony under the condition,
that they would co-exercise the control with the German federal government and that the trade
unions would have a significant role. In 1960, the federal government decided to privatize
Volkswagen. The state of Lower Saxony and the federal government each kept 20 per cent of
Volkswagen AG while 60 per cent were sold. The government intended to sell the shares as
free float to the German people, so that the shares lay with a huge amount of individual
investors.206 In 1988, the federal government sold its last shares and only the state of Lower
Saxony remains as governmental representation.
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Today, the ownership of Volkswagen AG is strongly dominated by two families:
Porsche and Piëch. The Porsche Holding SE, owned by the successors of Ferdinand Porsche
holds 50.73 per cent of the voting rights of Volkswagen AG.207 The second biggest block
investors is the state of Lower Saxony (20 per cent) followed by Qatar Holding LLC with 17
per cent. The remaining 12.27 per cent do not belong to any block holder and remain in free
float.
The control mechanisms concerning corporate governance in Volkswagen AG are
very unique. As a former public company, the law privatizing Volkswagen (Gesetzes über die
Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter
Haftung in private Hand, VWGmbHÜG)208 stated several provisions to protect the
corporation from hostile takeovers and to maintain the governmental control:
Firstly, § 2 VWGmbHÜG limits the voting rights for all investors to one-fifth. As the
German state held and the state of Lower Saxony still holds 20 per cent of the voting rights,
no investor can obtain more voting power than the state officials. This limitation is even more
important considering the special rules for the shareholders’ meeting. Decisions of the
shareholders’ meeting that would normally need a two-third majority need a four-fifth
majority, leading to a blocking minority for the state.
Furthermore, § 4 para. 1 VWGmbHÜG regulates the special right for Germany and
Lower Saxony concerning the right to elect representatives to the supervisory board as
Germany and Lower Saxony are, as long as they hold any shares, allowed to send two
members for the supervisory board, each without approval of the shareholders’ meeting.
This provision is even more important in combination with the laws regulating the codetermination in German corporations. According to § 7 para. 1 n° 3 MitbestG
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz, Co-Determination Act)209, the supervisory board in corporations
with more than 20000 employees consists of ten representatives of the investors and ten of the
workers. Keeping in mind that the government representatives belong to the investors, the
shareholders (excluding the government) can only send eight representatives (six if the federal
government would hold any shares) of twenty.
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A last protective regulations is stated in § 4 para. 2 VWGmbHÜG. Decisions
concerning new facilities or their relocation need to be passed by the supervisory board with a
two-third majority. With twenty members, the two-thirds majority is reached if 14 members
vote in favor. While this majority is easily reached by the ten workers’ representatives and the
state officials, the “ordinary” board members need to negotiate.

2. General Motors
The American equivalent of Volkswagen chosen for purposes of comparison is General
Motors (“GM”), one of America’s largest automobile manufacturers. Founded in 1908 by
William C. Durant,210 GM has a long tradition of corporate governance issues, making it an
exemplary choice for discussion as it serves to showcase many of the ownership and control
concerns discussed throughout this paper.
Today, almost 75% of GM is owned by institutional shareholders.211 Out of about 1.5
billion shares, approximately 1.15 billion are institutional shares.212 Vanguard Group and Harris
Associates, both institutional holders, together alone own over 10% of all outstanding shares.213
But its largest shareholder is actually the United Automobile Workers of America (“the
UAW”), through a retirement medical trust which owns about 8.7% of GM shares.214 Given
that labor traditionally does not receive any special consideration in the US, the union’s large
stake in GM certainly add a unique dimension to the auto manufacturer’s ownership and control
story. But its influence dates back to several decades. In 1936, GM suffered a three-month strike
by its workers protesting poor working conditions and was only resolved by negotiation with
the UAW.215 The Union continues to serve as an important bargaining agent for most American
autoworkers, and because of its influence, it has steadily advanced the interests of labor in a
giant public corporation, which is atypical to many American public corporations where the
focus is primarily on shareholder interests. Given the UAW’s ownership interest today, this
stakeholder has considerable equity leverage and is able to use its influence as a shareholder to
benefits its labor interests.
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In recent years, the corporation has undergone significant ownership transition
beginning with the federal bailout of General Motors in spring of 2009 after the company faced
bankruptcy after suffering a disastrous loss of $69.6 billion in 2007-2008.216 To salvage both
the company and an estimated million jobs, the government loaned GM $5.5 billion and
invested another $49.5 billion in the corporation, which equated to a 61% equity stake.217 From
2009 to 2013, when the government sold its ownership stake, a taskforce appointed by the
government oversaw the company’s activities. In the aftermath of the investment, the
government lost about $11.2 billion of their total investment218, and GM itself suffered
significant reputational damage from having a government overseer.219 Being labeled
“Government Motors,” is a stigma the company would not easily recover from.220 However,
proponents of state intervention argue that this picture is incomplete and that the governing task
force actually helped to significantly relieve the dire situation at GM.221 The company turned
profits in 2010, and in 2011, its profits were among the highest ever at $7.6 billion.222 During
the Obama Administration’s investment period, GM made a series of wise operational
decisions—it spun off the less profitable Saab and Saturn brands, consolidated operations and
its supply-chain, and began to invest in more energy-efficient cars.223 But perhaps it was less
fiscal concerns and more of the puppeteer strings that were attached to the arrangement that
frustrated management; given the typically wide discretion granted boards, public corporations
do not have to be concerned with stringent mandates set by their shareholders. However, this
deal was conditioned on GM being placed under certain limitations, including a cap on
executive compensation.224 Top management claimed that this control mechanism has severely
limited the company from recruiting the best executives and consequently losing talent to better
improve the company and generate value. Though considering that their pre-bailout CEO, Rick
Wagoner, was extremely well paid and rather aptly helped bring the company to the brink of
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bankruptcy, perhaps GM’s priorities should not be focused on bringing back higher executive
pay.
Shortly after the company completely privatized, GM was plagued by an instance of
aggressive shareholder activism in which a group of institutional investors demanded a stock
buyback of $8 billion and a seat on the board for Harry Wilson, a former member of the Obama
Administration Auto Industry Task Force appointed to oversee GM.225 The four hedge funds
backing Wilson were Appaloosa Management, Taconic Capital Advisors, Hayman Capital
Management, and HG Vora Capital management, who together controlled approximately 2.1
percent of GM stock.226 While it is certainly not unusual for activists to launch proxy contests
to elect their own directors, this particular instance of activism was unusual because it was
Wilson himself who went to the institutions and offered his ideas in exchange for compensation
packages with each fund. Unlike more prominent activist investors, Wilson did not have a
substantial stake in the company himself, owning only about 30,000 shares personally, nor was
he the head of a major hedge fund. Instead, in a rather entrepreneurial approach to activism, he
went out and sought hedge funds to support his ideas—including the $8 billion buyback
program and electing himself to a board position.227 He made a deal with each of the four hedge
funds for different levels of compensation if he was successfully elected to serve on the board.
For example, his commission with Appaloosa was set at 2% of the upturn on their GM shares,
and with Taconic Capital, it was set at 4%. Among other concerns about poor incentives, the
golden leashes likely encouraged him to avoid compromise with the company so he could
personally profit. The conflict present in any activist shareholder-nominated director is already
inherent—the financial compensation plans and side deals certainly only serve to make these
relationships more complicated. His contracts, representing four different leashes, with these
hedge funds, stipulating different term lengths and demands, would have certainly undermined
his ability to act consistently with respect to his fiduciary duties to all shareholders.
In March, GM acquiesced to the buyback and agreed to repurchase $5 billion worth of
shares in exchange for Wilson and the institutional funds abandoning their plan to elect Wilson
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to the board.228 The corporation’s desire to avoid a proxy battle was understandable—it would
have been extremely costly and ugly for both sides. In the following months, GM purchased
back 85 million common shares from its stockholders.229 At the outset of the GM’s
announcement, Moody’s ratings firm was clear that the buyback would have a negative credit
implication on GM.230 Given the numerous financial and operational difficulties still facing the
corporation, its decision to reduce its liquidity position of $25 billion by 20% to fund the
repurchase program was a suboptimal decision. That shareholders holding approximately 2%
of all shares could affect such drastic change that is potentially detrimental to the corporation
epitomizes the influence activists can have, despite not having a comparable ownership stake
and risk. This effective separation of economic ownership from control has dangerous
implications and these activist arrangements raise serious questions on good corporate
governance—perhaps it is time for the either government regulators or the private sector, to
reexamine activism and the mechanisms activists would use to exercise control.

3. Comparative analysis
The comparison between General Motors and Volkswagen stands exemplary for the
difference in German and US corporations. Although both are not “typical” corporations as they
have an outstanding position in the national economy, their similar position in the national but
also worldwide economy and the involvement of the national government makes them
interesting cases to analyze.
General Motors and Volkswagen both are dominated by institutional shareholders. With
88 per cent, the rate is a bit higher than for General Motors with 75 per cent. The important
aspect while comparing both corporations is the number of institutional shareholders. As
mentioned Vanguard Group, Harris Associates and the UAW are the biggest block shareholder.
Together they own almost 20 per cent of the shares. In comparison with Volkswagen that is
somewhere between the Quatar Holding and the state of Lower Saxony. The three biggest (and
only) institutional shareholders of Volkswagen together own the 88 per cent while the biggest
three of General Motors stay around 20 per cent. This example is also characteristic for
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comparing the US and Germany. Although the biggest shareholder blocks in the DAX listed
corporations lowered their investments, block-shareholding is still very important in Germany
while in the United States blocks over 10 per cent are exceptional.
An interesting and unexpected issue is the ownership of the UAW. Seeing the diversity
of shareholders in the United States, their voting block of 8.7 per cent is a serious factor. The
German trade unions on the other side do not own shares of Volkswagen, although it was
planned from the first years after the war on that the workers of Volkswagen should have a
strong position. Generally it is possible for German trade unions to invest in shares but it would
not have been appreciated a few years ago. In the DAX and also concerning Volkswagen, the
trade unions do not play an important role as investors. This might also be due to the fact that
their influence in corporations is guaranteed by the German legal framework.
Another interesting aspect to highlight is the governmental involvement in both
corporations. Firstly it is important to state out is the difference in their investments’ origin.
While the predecessor of the German state was the driving force behind Volkswagen, General
Motors has been founded by a private entrepreneur and the US government only got involved
because of the crisis at General Motors and the upcoming bankruptcy. Also the maximum
influence differs. Only considering Volkswagen after it was handed over by the British military
command, the highest amount of shares held by the state of Lower Saxony and the Federal
Republic has been 40 per cent. After the US government stepped in during the crisis, the highest
amount held have been 61 per cent.
Besides the amount’s height, the use of those shares is probably the most interesting
aspect in this analysis. The US government shortly after it acquired the shares started to reprivatize the corporation without any intention to guard a certain amount of shares to keep any
influence on General Motors. In Germany, only the federal government sold its shares while
Lower Saxony guards its shares like its most valuable treasure. In 2007, the German
government even risked a confrontation with the EC because it has seen the protective
provisions described as violation of the European treaties.
E. Conclusion
The ownership structure of companies is a significant component of any discussion on
corporate governance. Despite differences in cultural values, investor confidence in the
market, and regulatory schemes, Germany and the US are both presented with the same
fundamental problem: how to minimize agency costs necessarily associated with a separation
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of ownership and control. As ownership structure changes over time, so too does the effect on
control and ultimately, corporate performance. The two nations’ similar trajectory towards
institutionalism may indicate a more enduring and global trend.
In Germany, there is a general concern about the behavior of individual shareholders,
and the courts and regulators have implemented instruments to help remedy any potential
abuses of power. The protective measures are aimed at correcting the conflicts between
individual shareholders and between shareholders and stakeholders. In the US, the primary
conflict that has traditionally created anxiety is the relationship between management and
shareholders. But the agency concerns have changed in the US as a consequence of the
evolution of share ownership. The questions that have been relevant to Germany for years is
now demanding notably more attention in the US than ever before. What is the proper
function of a company and whose interests should it ultimately serve? How can minority
interests be protected in light of an unbalanced control dynamic in the shareholder base, and
how should those mechanisms be optimally implemented—by the state or through private
ordering? These trends feature in most of the current discussions on corporate governance and
despite the noticeable differences found in the comparison between these two nations, the
fundamental concerns about ownership and control are universal and not symptomatic of one
nation in particular.
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